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Abstract
Major revolts have recently erupted in parts of the Middle East with substantial international repercussions. Pre-
dicting, coping with and winning those revolts have become a grave problem for many regimes and for world powers.
We propose a new model of such revolts that describes their evolution by building on the classic Lanchester theory of
combat. The model accounts for the split in the population between those loyal to the regime and those favoring the
rebels. We show that, contrary to classical Lanchesterian insights regarding traditional force-on-force engagements,
the outcome of a revolt is independent of the initial force sizes; it only depends on the fraction of the population
supporting each side and their combat effectiveness. We also consider the effects of foreign intervention and of shift-
ing loyalties of the two populations during the conflict. The model’s predictions are consistent with the situations
currently observed in Afghanistan, Libya and Syria (Spring 2011) and it offers tentative guidance on policy.
1 Introduction
Recent (2011) events in Libya underscore the significant impact of armed revolts on regional and global
interests. Armed revolts typically start with demonstrations and civic unrest that quickly turn into local
violence and then full-scale combat. (The terms revolt, rebellion, and insurgency are interchangeable in most
senses and we use the term revolt throughout for consistency.) As demonstrated in Libya the evolution of
the armed revolt has a strong spatial component; individuals in some regions (e.g., parts of Tripoli) may
be loyal to the regime because of ideology or economic and social incentives or fear, while other regions
(e.g., Benghazi) become bastions of the rebels powered by strong local popular support. Thus, armed
revolts, very much like conventional war, are about gaining and controlling populated territory. However,
unlike conventional force-on-force engagements, where the civilian population plays a background role, armed
revolts are characterized by the active role of the people, who become a major factor in determining the
outcome of the conflict: both the rebels and the regime need the support of the population to carry out their
campaigns [3, 4, 6].
Our approach to modeling armed revolts is based on Lanchester theory [5] that describes the strength
of two opposing military forces by two ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The forces cause mutual
attrition that depletes their strengths until one of the forces is defeated. While Lanchester models are
stylized and highly abstract, they have been extensively used for analysis for almost a century because they
provide profound insights regarding conditions that affect the outcomes of military conflicts [11].
Using our model, we derive the end-state of the revolt, identify stalemate situations and study the
effects of foreign intervention and of inconstant support by the population. We show that contrary to
classical Lanchesterian insights regarding traditional force-on-force engagements, the outcome of a revolt is
independent of the initial force sizes. We also derive conditions for successful foreign interventions. These
results are consistent with the situations currently (Spring 2011) observed in Afghanistan, Libya and Syria.
We also evaluate policy options facing the international community.
2 Setting and Assumptions
Consider an armed revolt involving two forces, termed Red and Blue, that rely on the population for man-
power, intelligence, and most other resources. The population is divided into supporters of the Blue, called
henceforth supporters, and supporters of Red, called henceforth contrarians. We initially assume that the
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Fig. 1: Schematic dynamics of the model. The four variables in the model appear as boxes, where each box
represents a possible combination of population behavior and controlling force. Solid lines indicate
change in control of population while dashed lines indicate the force causing it. Observe that the
population does not change allegiances even under occupation.
support strongly depends on factors such as tribal affiliation, social class, and ideology and therefore remains
unchanged during the armed revolt. However, later on we relax this assumption and allow for changes in
popular behavior, reflecting pragmatic and opportunistic responses of the population to changes in the force
balance.
We assume that the country is divided between Red and Blue and therefore a populated region lost by
one force is gained by the other force. A force that fights over a region might be either supported or opposed
by the local population, situations which we call liberation or subjugation, respectively. A liberating force
fights more effectively than a subjugating force because of population support, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the
forces in control of hostile regions are busy policing the population and therefore adopt a defensive posture.
Thus, only the forces operating in friendly regions proactively attempt to capture additional territories.
3 Model
Let S and C (S + C = 1) denote the fraction of the total population who are supporters of Blue and
supporters of Red (“contrarians”), respectively. Let also B and R (B + R = 1) denote the fraction of the
population controlled by Blue and Red, respectively. We use the notation XY for the fraction of population
X that is controlled by force Y , where X = S,C and Y = B,R. Hence, SB + SR = S and CB + CR = C.
When Blue subjugates a CR region it becomes part of CB and when Blue liberates an SR area it becomes
part of SB. Similar actions are possible by Red, giving a total of four kinds of combat engagements, as
shown in Figure 1.
Because Red and Blue operate in populated areas, the outcome of an engagement depends both on the
strength of the attacking force but also on the signature (i.e. visibility) of the defending force; smaller attack
force (“fewer shooters”) or smaller signature (“fewer targets”) result in a smaller gain/loss rate. Namely,
at each interaction, the gain rate of the attacker is given by a scaling constant, called henceforth attrition
rate, multiplied by the product of the attacking and defending force sizes. This relationship implies that
even a large attacker would struggle to suppress a small defender diffused in the population. The resulting
model is an adaptation of the Lanchester Linear Law (see e.g., [11] p. 83) and Deitchman’s guerrilla warfare
model [2].
The attrition rate constants depend on the tactics and equipment of the parties as well as the behavior
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of the population. Thus, let fS and fC denote the rates of liberation of friendly regions by Blue and Red
forces, respectively. Similarly, let hC and hS denote the rates of subjugation of hostile regions by Blue and
Red, respectively. The resulting dynamics are given in Eqs. 1.
SB′ = +fSSB · SR− hSCR · SB
SR′ = −fSSB · SR+ hSCR · SB (1)
CR′ = +fCCR · CB − hCSB · CR
CB′ = −fCCR · CB + hCSB · CR
Since it is easier to fight in friendly territory, we make the following dominance assumption:
fS > hC and fC > hS . (2)
4 End-State of the Revolt
From solving Eqs. 1 we obtain that the conflict can result in one of three outcomes, corresponding to the
stable equilibrium points of the equations:
1. Blue victory: SB + CB = 1,
2. Red victory: CR+ SR = 1,
3. Stalemate: Both sides control a fraction of the total population.
It can be shown that the evolution of the conflict does not involve cycles where populated regions change
sides endlessly; rather, the conflict dissipates and reaches a stable state (proofs of this and all other results
are given in the Supporting Information at the end of this article.)
The stable outcomes are not dependent on all four attrition rates but rather on two ratios: rS =
fS
hS
and
rC =
fC
hC
. We call these the “liberation-subjugation effectiveness ratio” (LSER) of supporters and contrarians,
respectively. These ratios account for differences in tactics, technology, and information between Blue and
Red, and also reflect the ability and commitment of the local population to support its preferred force. The
outcomes are:
Blue wins if and only if rC <
S
1− S
(3)
Red wins if and only if rS <
1− S
S
(4)
Stalemate occurs otherwise.
These results4 are summarized in Figure 2(left). It follows from Ineqs. 3–4 that the fate of the armed revolt
is completely determined by the LSERs and the population split between supporters S and contrarians
C = 1 − S; it does not depend on the initial sizes of the Blue and Red forces. Moreover, the minimum
popular support needed to guarantee Blue’s win only depends on the LSER in the contrarians’ territory.
Specifically, Blue wins if and only if rC(1−S) < S, that is, if the fraction of its supporters is larger than the
fraction of contrarians times the LSER in contrarians’ territory. An equivalent statement applies for Red
victory, which happens if and only if rS(1 − C) < C. The operational implication of these two conditions
is that strengthening one’s advantage in friendly territories (e.g., Blue increasing rS) may be sufficient to
avoid defeat but not to secure a win; if one is not effectively fighting in hostile territory (e.g., Blue cannot
sufficiently decrease rC) then one cannot win; the best it can hope for is a stalemate. At the stalemate
equilibrium, denoted XYb
CBb =
S(1 + rS)− 1
rSrC − 1
, SRb =
rC − S(1 + rC)
rSrC − 1
, (5)
SBb = rCCBb, CRb = rSSRb.
4 Technically, we assume that at the start of the dynamics both forces have some presence in a friendly territory, i.e. SB0 > 0
and CR0 > 0. Otherwise, one of the forces is never challenged and wins trivially. Also, the model has a fourth equilibrium that
corresponds to the case where the territory is divided between Blue and Red who control only hostile territory (SR+CB = 1).
Obviously, such a situation is very unlikely and indeed this equilibrium is unstable, as shown in the Supporting Information.
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Fig. 2: Outcomes of the conflict when S = 40% as a function of rS and rC . (left) The possible outcomes
are: stalemate (gray), Red victory (red) and Blue victory (blue). The white area is excluded by the
dominance assumption (Ineqs. 2). Outright victory is possible only when one party has a low LSER.
Increasing rS and rC makes both parties much more entrenched in their areas, leading to a stalemate
regardless of the value of S. (right) The amount of territory controlled by Blue. Observe that a very
sharp change in the outcome is predicted as rC approaches
2
3
, from a balanced stalemate to a Blue
victory.
Notice that the denominators are always positive because of the dominance assumption (see Ineqs. 2). Eqs. 5
indicate that as S increases an increasing part of the population is controlled by Blue. When rC increases,
a larger fraction of the contrarians is able to remain free (i.e. ruled by Red).
We plot the fraction of the population controlled by Blue during a stalemate (i.e., CB + SB) in Fig-
ure 2(right). (We only present the plot for S = 0.4, but other values of S are qualitatively similar.) Near the
Blue victory condition defined by Ineq. 3 the fraction of the population controlled by Blue is near one, but
quickly decreases as rC increases. Similarly, the fraction of population controlled by Blue rapidly increases
as rS moves away from the Red victory condition. However, after the significant initial change in the fraction
of Blue’s regions as rS or rC increases, the surface flattens out. As both rS and rC continue to increase, the
fraction of Blue’s regions approaches S. Therefore, when rS and rC are reasonably bounded away from their
thresholds, an entrenched stalemate occurs where Red and Blue control primarily their friendly territories.
5 Extensions of the Basic model
We consider now two extensions of the basic model: the case of foreign intervention and the case of shifting
popular support.
5.1 Foreign Military Intervention
Most large revolts in modern times involved foreign military interventions by regional or global powers [8, 9].
Such interventions can be manifested in two ways: direct and indirect. Direct intervention (e.g., air-strike
support to ground units, such as the intervention of NATO forces in Libya in 2011) allows the supported
side to exercise more firepower against its opponent. Indirect intervention provides the supported side with
force multipliers such as intelligence, training, logistical support and advanced weapons, but no additional
firepower per se. In both cases we assume that just one side, say Blue, receives the foreign support. We
leave for future studies to consider the case of foreign support to both sides.
Direct intervention. For simplicity, suppose that the foreign constituent is tactically superior and it ex-
periences negligible attrition (e.g., air support for Blue that is subject to ineffective air defense of Red).
Therefore, the effectiveness of the foreign constituent remains fixed throughout the armed revolt. However,
similarly to the direct engagements discussed above, its ability to target Red diminishes as the size of Red’s
forces decreases. In that case, Red targets are harder to find and engage. Let λS , λC > 0 denote the combat
power of the foreign constituent when operating in supporters’ (S) regions and contrarians’ (C) regions,
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respectively. The separation into two combat power parameters allow for the possibility that the foreign
constituent only contributes to certain kinds of operations (e.g. only to liberating supporters), and/or is
affected by the behavior of the population, just like Blue. In this case Eqs. 1 become
SB′ = +fSSB · SR− hSCR · SB + λSSR
SR′ = −fSSB · SR+ hSCR · SB − λSSR (6)
CR′ = +fCCR · CB − hCSB · CR − λCCR
CB′ = −fCCR · CB + hCSB · CR + λCCR
Since the effectiveness of the foreign constituent remains unaffected, it is clear that Red cannot win. The
only two outcomes are Blue’s victory and a stalemate. Blue wins if and only if λC > fC(1 − S) − hCS.
Otherwise, the armed revolt ends in a stalemate. Like in the basic model, the conflict dissipates and reaches
a stable state, and no cycles are possible.
An interesting observation is that the value of λS – the combat power of the foreign constituent in
friendly regions – plays no role in helping Blue achieve victory; it only ensures that Blue will not lose as
long as λS > 0. The threshold of λC that determines Blue’s victory is the difference between two terms,
each a combination of combat effectiveness and popular support: fC(1 − S) is Red’s effectiveness fighting
on friendly territory times its popular support, and hCS is Blue’s effectiveness fighting on hostile territory
times its popular support. Clearly, this threshold decreases as the support to Blue increases. In particular,
a sufficient condition for Blue victory is λC > fC , which only depends upon the fighting effectiveness of Red.
Consequently, even if Blue has limited tactical capabilities or a small amount of popular support, it can still
prevail with enough assistance from a foreign constituent.
Indirect intervention. Indirect intervention (force multiplier) increases the ability of Blue to defend its
territory and to attack Red forces. Specifically, the liberation rate fS and the subjugation rate hC are
multiplied by factors µS , µC > 1, respectively, where the structure of Eqs. 1 remains unchanged. The LSER
values rS and rC change to µSrS and
rC
µC
, respectively. Using the conditions in Ineq. 4 we obtain that for
Blue to avoid defeat it is sufficient that the intervention be such that:
µS ≥
1− S
rSS
.
In order to secure a win, it follows from Ineq. 3 that the support for Blue must be such that
µC >
rC(1− S)
S
.
Because rSrC > 1, the threshold of µC is always larger than the threshold of µS – it is more costly to secure
a victory than to avoid a loss. Obviously, the indirect intervention is needed to secure a victory only if S is
small enough, specifically, if S < rC
1+rC
. Note that “small enough” may actually be quite large when Red is
very effective on its own turf compared with Blue (rC is large).
5.2 Opportunistic Population
While in some conflicts the behavior of the people is highly polarized and unchanging, in others the population
might be quite opportunistic and favor the side that appears more likely to win. It follows that the fraction
of the supporters, and hence contrarians, changes according to the state of the conflict. We capture this
situation by treating the fraction of supporters S as a dynamic variable, and adding to Eqs. 1 an equation
for S′. The value of S′ increases with the fraction of population Blue controls (SB + CB) and decreases
with the fraction controlled by Red (CR+SR). Because C = 1− S, SR = S − SB, and CB = 1− S −CR,
we obtain from Eqs. 1 the three independent equations:
SB′ = +fSSB(S − SB)− hSCR · SB
CR′ = +fCCR(1− S − CR)− hCSB · CR (7)
S′ = +α(SB + 1− S − CR)(1 − S)− α(CR + S − SB)S,
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where α is a parameter that determines the rate at which individuals switch allegiances, which is assumed
to be the same for both the supporters and contrarians. With opportunistic population there are only two
potential outcomes:
1. Blue victory where the entire population supports Blue, who controls all regions (SB = 1), and
2. Red victory where the entire population supports Red, who controls all regions (CR = 1).
These two equilibria are stable for all parameter values. There are also two stalemate equilibria: a
balanced stalemate where SB,CR > 0, and a disarmed stalemate where SB = CR = 0. Neither of the
two stalemate equilibria are stable. The disarmed stalemate is neither realistic nor relevant. The balanced
stalemate, given below, is more interesting because it lies on a boundary that separates the basins of attraction
for the two victory situations:
SB∗ =
rC
2 + rS + rC
, (8)
CR∗ =
rS
2 + rS + rC
, (9)
S∗ =
1 + rC
2 + rS + rC
. (10)
Thus, the stalemate equilibrium gives a rough metric for the potential outcome of the conflict. For example,
the closer the stalemate equilibrium is to the Blue victory point, the more likely Red will win the conflict.
This occurs because most of the 3-dimensional (rS , rC , S) parameter space lies in the basin of attraction
corresponding to Red victory.
6 Discussion of Some Armed Revolts
Using the results above, we analyze several ongoing (in 2011) revolts. While we could not access reliable
data to empirically validate our model (e.g., estimates of LSERs rS and rC or time-series data of conflicts),
we show that many of the ongoing conflicts are at a state consistent with our model. The model suggests
how their outcomes might be effected by decisions including those currently on the policy table.
Libya
The available information regarding the revolt in Libya is based mainly on fragmented news reports.
As of June 2011, it appears that at least three of the seven largest districts in Libya – Benghazi, Misrata
and Az-Zawiya – support the rebels, which amount to at least 40% of the population. The Qaddafi forces
(labeled Red) are much better trained, equipped and organized than the rebels (labeled Blue). Therefore, if
S denotes the supporters of the rebels, it is reasonable to assume that fS < hS and fC > hC – the regime
forces have the upper hand even in hostile regions, which implies that rS < 1 and rC > 1. Ineq. 4 suggests
that Qaddafi should have achieved a clear victory, crushing the revolt. Indeed, he appeared to be nearing
victory until the intervention of NATO forces that implemented a no-fly zone and later launched a series of
air-strikes against Qaddafi’s forces. In our terminology, NATO forces have applied direct intervention. This
intervention, if sustained, implies that the rebels now cannot be defeated. From news reports it appears that
the rebels have also been provided training and gear to help them repel Qaddafi’s attempts at recapturing
rebelling population, i.e. increasing the rebels’ rS . At the same time, the rebels have been unable to make
inroads into territory currently controlled by Qaddafi, so rC is largely unchanged. Under those conditions
the model suggests that the most likely outcome is a protracted stalemate. To achieve victory for the rebels,
the foreign intervention must focus on decreasing rC and/or increasing λC , that is, attack or help attack the
regions supporting the regime.
Afghanistan
One can view the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan (2001-) as a struggle of government and coalition forces
(Blue) against Salafists (Red) led by the Taliban. Many observers of the conflict point to the critical need
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of both parties to win the support of the population, so the conflict is a good application of our model.
According to the 2007 report by the International Council on Security and Development, the Taliban have
permanent presence in 54% of the country [7]. Suppose, pessimistically, that the Taliban movement has the
support of all the people in the regions where it is present. Assuming fixed behavior of the population (no
opportunistic shifts) the situation in Afghanistan will continue in its current stalemate form unless rS < 1.17
(giving Red a victory) or rC < 0.85 (giving Blue a victory). Thus, the model suggests that the government
can avoid a Taliban takeover of the country by nurturing the support of the population it currently controls,
and it is not necessary to push back the Taliban from their areas.
Syria
The civil unrest in Syria currently pits the Syrian army and paramilitaries against massive but unarmed
demonstrations. If the situation escalates into an armed revolt, what might be its outcome? It would appear
that special units of the Syrian army possess superior tactics and weapons sufficient to suppress any domestic
military opponent. However, we anticipate the regime to face a strong challenge because of its narrow base
of support in the Alawite sect. If we assume that loyalties do not shift, then the rebels (Red) would be
victorious against the government (Blue) if rS <
1−S
S
(Ineq. 4). Assuming S ≈ 10% (the entire Alawite
community [1]), the government must have LSER of rS ≥ 9 to avoid defeat. This seems unlikely given
the discontent even within the Alawite community and the ease with which foreign backers of the rebels
could provide them with military hardware, such as armor-piercing munitions and air cover to neutralize
government forces. The current (June 2011) observed stalemate is a result of small foreign intervention by
Iranian and Hezbollah combatants. This intervention is covert and therefore very fragile. Thus, we expect
that in an armed revolt along the lines of our model, Syria’s Assad regime would be defeated.
7 Conclusions and Policy Implications
We present a new Lanchester-type model that represents the dynamics of liberating and subjugating pop-
ulated regions in the setting of an armed revolt. We identify winning and stalemate conditions and obtain
some general insights regarding the revolt’s end state. Many revolts do not have a decisive outcome, with
both sides entrenched in a prolonged stalemate. Our model explicitly identifies this realistic outcome, which
is not captured in classical Lanchester theory. Our model also illustrates that it is not sufficient to ably
control friendly regions; for victory it is crucial to be able to effectively fight in hostile regions.
We also study the effect of foreign intervention (e.g., NATO intervention in Libya) on the outcome of a
revolt. We find that while direct intervention to support one side will prevent defeat of that side and can
facilitate a win even if that side has very little popular support, indirect intervention cannot guarantee this.
If the opponent (Red) has strong popular support and the supported force (Blue) has a poor LSER such
that 1−S
rSS
> 1, then if 1 < µS <
1−S
rSS
, the supported force will actually lose – the indirect support is simply
not large enough. The level of foreign intervention (either direct or indirect) required to defeat an opponent
depends on the popular support (S) and the attrition coefficients (fC and hC) in the contrarians’ territory;
it does not depend on the capabilities of the forces in supporters’ regions.
Finally if the population can shift its support, then a stalemate is not possible. A bandwagon-type effect
will occur where the population increases its support to the apparent winner, which strengthens it and leads
to more support, which further strengthens it and so on until the side achieves victory. Unlike the case of
fixed population behavior, the results of this scenario are sensitive to the initial conditions.
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8 Supporting Information
We present here the mathematical proofs of the results presented in the main text.
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8.1 Victory Conditions
In general, dynamical systems may exhibit stable oscillations. We now show that the system of equations
in Eqs. 1 does not have those oscillations (no limit cycles). This means that the state variables will always
reach one of the equilibrium points (by the Poincare´-Bendixon Theorem [10]).
Theorem 1 (Dulac’s Criterion [10]). Let x˙ = f(x) be a smooth system on a simply-connected set S ⊂ R2.
Let w : S → R be smooth on S. Suppose on S the expression ∇ · (f(x)w(x)) does not change sign. Then the
system has no limit cycle on S.
Proposition 1. The system of Eqs. 1 does not have limit cycles.
Proof. We first write the model as a system of two independent equations by removing the mixed variables:
SB′ = +fSSB(S − SB)− hSCR · SB (11)
CR′ = +fCCR(C − CR)− hCSB · CR (12)
Let
w(SB,CR) =
1
SB(S − SB)CR(C − CR)
.
Both the system and w are smooth on the set (0, S)× (0, C) (points on the boundary of this space move to
one of the fixed points and do not oscillate.)
∇ · (fw) = ∇ ·
(
fS(S − SB)− hSCR
(S − SB)CR(C − CR)
,
fC(C − CR)− hCSB
SB(S − SB)(C − CR)
)
=
−hS
(S − SB)2(C − CR)
+
−hC
(S − SB)(C − CR)2
< 0.
We next show that the victory conditions in 3, 4 correspond to the stability conditions for the equilibria
points. Throughout, we assume that 0 < S < 1, i.e. S is not on its boundary.
Theorem 2. The following four statements hold for the system of differential equations defined by Eqs. 1:
• The equilibrium CR = SB = 0 and SR = 1− CB = S is never stable.
• The Blue victory equilibrium (CR = SR = 0 and SB = 1−CB = S) is stable if and only if rC <
S
1−S
.
• The Red victory equilibrium (SB = CB = 0 and CR = 1 − SB = 1 − S) is stable if and only if
rS <
1−S
S
.
• The stalemate equilibrium (defined by Eqs. 5)) is stable if and only if rC ≥
S
1−S
and rS ≥
1−S
S
.
Proof. The model is fully specified based on two variables: SB and CR, Eqs. 11-12. We first compute the
Jacobian of the right hand size of differential equation
J(SB,CR) =
(
fS(S − 2SB)− hSCR −hSSB
−hCCR fC(1− S − 2CR)− hCSB
)
A solution (SB∗, CR∗) to the differential equation is stable if the two eigenvalues of J(SB∗, CR∗) have
negative real parts [10]. By inspection the equilibrium with SB = CR = 0 is not stable for any parameter
values.
Blue Victory
The characteristic polynomial in this case is
(−fSS − λ)(fC(1− S)− hCS − λ) = 0 .
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The first eigenvalue, −fSS, is always negative and the second eigenvalue, fC(1 − S) − hCS, is negative if
rC <
S
1−S
.
Red Victory
The characteristic polynomial in this case is
(−fC(1 − S)− λ)(fSS − hS(1− S)− λ) = 0 .
The first eigenvalue, −fC(1−S), is always negative and the second eigenvalue, fSS − hS(1−S), is negative
if rS <
1−S
S
. By the dominance assumption (i.e., Ineq. 2)) rSrC > 1 and thus
1
1+rS
< rC
1+rC
. Therefore it is
not possible for both the Blue victory and Red victory to be stable equilibria for the same values of rS and
rC . This also implies that if rS <
1−S
S
a Blue victory cannot occur and if rC <
S
1−S
a Red victory cannot
occur.
Stalemate
At the stalemate equilibrium in section 4, the variables have the values SBb, SRb, CRb, and CBb. We next
present a lemma, and then prove that the stalemate equilibrium is stable if and only if 1
1+rS
< S < rC
1+rC
,
which is equivalent to the two conditions rC ≥
S
1−S
and rS ≥
1−S
S
Lemma 1. The product SBbCRb is positive if and only if
1
1+rS
< S < rC
1+rC
.
Proof. By Eqs. 5, SBb is positive if
1
1+rS
< S, and CRb is positive if S <
rC
1+rC
. By the dominance
assumption (Ineq. 2) 1
1+rS
< rC
1+rC
, and therefore it is impossible for SBb and CRb to both be negative.
Lemma 1 and Eqs. 5 imply that if 1
1+rS
< S < rC
1+rC
, then SBb, SRb, CRb, and CBb are all positive
(and by conservation of total population, less than 1). The Jacobian matrix for the stalemate equilibrium is
J(SBb, CRb) =
(
−fSSBb −hSSBb
−hCCRb −fCCRb
)
We derive the upper left hand element of this Jacobian below
J11(SBb, CRb) = fS(S − 2SBb)− hSCRb
= hS(rS(S − 2SBb)− rSSRb)
= fS
(
S −
2SrC(1 + rS)− 2rC
rSrC − 1
−
rC − S(1 + rC)
rSrC − 1
)
= −fSSBb
The lower right hand element of J(SBb, CRb) can be derived in a similar fashion and we omit the details.
The eigenvalues of J(SBb, CRb) will both have a negative real component if the trace of J(SBb, CRb) is
negative and the determinant is positive. The determinant of J(SBb, CRb) is SBbCRbhChS(rSrC − 1). If
1
1+rS
< S < rC
1+rC
, then by Lemma 1 the trace is negative and the determinant is positive and thus the
stalemate equilibrium is stable. If S /∈
(
1
1+rS
, rC
1+rC
)
then by Lemma 1 the determinant of J(SBb, CRb) is
negative and thus one of the eigenvalues has a positive real component and the stalemate equilibrium is not
stable.
8.2 Direct Foreign Intervention
Let us rewrite the direct intervention dynamics of Eqs. 6:
SB′ = +fS
(
SB +
λS
fS
)
SR− hSCR · SB
SR′ = −fS
(
SB +
λS
fS
)
SR+ hSCR · SB (13)
CR′ = +fCCR · CB − hC
(
SB +
λC
hC
)
CR
CB′ = −fCCR · CB + hC
(
SB +
λC
hC
)
CR
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Furthermore let us define AS ≡
λS
fS
and AC ≡
λC
hC
. The stalemate equilibrium of these equations is denoted
with a subscript fi (“foreign intervention”) and we present them below.
SBfi =
SBb
2
−
AS
2
+
AC −AS
2(rSrC − 1)
+
√(
SBb
2
−
AS
2
+
AC −AS
2(rSrC − 1)
)2
+
rSrCASS
rSrC − 1
(14)
SRfi = S − SBfi (15)
CBfi =
SBfi +AC
rC
(16)
CRfi = 1− S − CBfi (17)
(SBb is the value at stalemate of the variable SB in the basic model, Eqs. 5.) To derive these expressions
we first write the analog of Eqs. 11–12:
SB′ = +fS(SB +AS)(S − SB)− hSCR · SB (18)
CR′ = +fCCR(1− S − CR)− hC(SB +AC)CR (19)
Solving Eqs. 18–19 for the stalemate equilibrium root results in two equations
fS(SB +AS)(S − SB) = hSCR · SB (20)
fC(1− S − CR) = hC(SB +AC) (21)
Solving Eq. 20 for CR and substituting into Eq. 21 produces a quadratic in SB. Solving for the positive
root of that quadratic yields the expression for SBfi in Eq. 14. Substituting SBfi into Eq. 21 gives CBfi
in Eq. 16. Similarly to the basic model, it is possible to exclude cycles, as follows.
Proposition 2. The set of Eqs. 6 does not have limit cycles.
Proof. We will work with the two independent Eqs. 18 and 19.
Let
w(SB,CR) =
1
(SB +AS)CR(1 − S − CR)
.
Both the system and w are smooth on the set (0, S)× (0, 1− S).
wSB′ =
fS(SB +AS)(S − SB)− hSCR · SB
(SB +AS)CR(1− S − CR)
=
fS(S − SB)
CR(1− S − CR)
−
hS
(1− S − CR)
(
1 +
AS
SB
)
−1
wCR′ =
fCCR(1− S − CR)− hC(SB +AC)CR
(SB +AS)CR(1− S − CR)
=
fC
SB +AS
−
hC(SB +AC)
(SB +AS)(1− S − CR)
.
Note that 1− S − CR = C − CR > 0 in the strictly positive quadrant. Therefore,
∇ · (fw) =
−fS
CR(1− S − CR)
−
hS
(1− S − CR)
(−1)
(
1 +
AS
SB
)
−2
−AS
SB2
+ 0−
hC(SB +AC)
(SB +AS)(1 − S − CR)2
< 0.
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Before proceeding to examine the stability properties of the victory equilibrium and the stalemate equi-
librium, we note there are two other equilibrium points to the system defined by Eqs. 6: CR = 0, SB = −λS
fS
and an equilibrium similar to Eqs. 14–17, but with SBfi the negative root of the quadratic that produced
Eq. 14. Because both of these equilibria consist of negative values, which cannot be realized, we do not
analyze them further. We next show that the victory condition defined in section 5.1 corresponds to the
stability conditions for the equilibria points.
Theorem 3. For the system of differential equations defined by Eqs. 13, the Blue victory equilibrium (CR =
SR = 0) is stable if and only if rC−AC
1+rC
< S.
Proof. We first compute the Jacobian of the right hand size of differential equation defined in Eqs. 18–19
Jfi(SB,CR) =
(
fS(S − 2SB −AS)− hSCR −hSSB
−hCCR fC(1− S − 2CR)− hC(SB +AC)
)
For the Blue victory equilibrium (SB = S,CR = 0), the characteristic polynomial is
(−fS(S +AS)− λ)(fC(1 − S)− hC(S +AC)− λ) = 0 .
The first eigenvalue, −fS(S + AS), is always negative and the second eigenvalue, fC(1 − S)− hC(S +AC),
is negative if rC−AC
1+rC
< S. Writing out this condition in terms of the direct foreign intervention parameter
λC = AChC produces the condition: λC > fC(1− S) + hCS.
Theorem 3 provides a necessary condition for Blue victory. We have not been able to prove the stability
characteristics for the stalemate equilibrium analytically, which would provide the sufficient conditions for
Blue victory. This is given in Conjecture 1 and extensive numerical experimentation makes us confident that
this conjecture does hold.
Conjecture 1.
The stalemate equilibrium defined in Eqs. 14–17 is stable if and only if rC−AC
1+rC
> S.
8.3 Opportunistic Population
We next show that victory is the only possible outcome of the opportunistic population model of section 5.2.
Theorem 4. The following four statements hold for the system of differential equations defined by Eqs. 7:
• The equilibrium CR = SB = 0 and S = 1
2
is never stable.
• The Blue victory equilibrium (CR = 0 and SB = S = 1 ) is always stable.
• The Red victory equilibrium (SB = S = 0 and CR = 1) is always stable.
• The stalemate equilibrium defined in Eqs. 8–10 is never stable.
Proof. We first compute the Jacobian of Eqs. 7
Jop(SB,CR, S) =

fS(S − 2SB)− hSCR −hSSB fSSB−hCCR fC(1 − S − 2CR)− hCSB −fCCR
α α −2α


A solution (SB∗, CR∗, S∗) to the differential equation is stable if the three eigenvalues of Jop(SB
∗, CR∗, S∗)
have negative real parts. By inspection the equilibrium with (SB∗, CR∗, S∗) = (0, 0, 1
2
) is not stable for any
parameter values.
Blue Victory
For the equilibrium (SB∗, CR∗, S∗) = (1, 0, 1) the characteristic polynomial is
(−hC − λ)(λ
2 + λ(2α+ fS) + αfS) = 0 .
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The first eigenvalue, −hC , is always negative and the second and third eigenvalues are always negative by
appealing to the quadratic formula for the second term.
Red Victory
For the equilibrium (SB∗, CR∗, S∗) = (0, 1, 0) the characteristic polynomial is
(−hS − λ)(λ
2 + λ(2α+ fC) + αfC) = 0 .
The first eigenvalue, −hS , is always negative and the second and third eigenvalues are always negative by
appealing to the quadratic formula for the second term.
Stalemate
Substituting the equilibrium points Eqs. 8–10 into the Jacobian yields
Jop(SB
∗, CR∗, S∗) =

−
fSrC
2+rS+rC
− hSrC
2+rS+rC
fSrC
2+rS+rC
− hCrS
2+rS+rC
−
fCrS
2+rS+rC
−
fCrS
2+rS+rC
α −α −2α


To calculate the eigenvalues, we need to find the roots of the characteristic polynomial
g(λ) = det (Jop(SB
∗, CR∗, S∗)− λI) .
Because limλ→∞ g(λ) = −∞, if g(0) = det (Jop(SB
∗, CR∗, S∗)) > 0, then by the Intermediate Value Theo-
rem there must be a positive eigenvalue and the stalemate equilibrium must be unstable. We will now show
that this is the case for all possible parameter values. Computing the determinant:
det (Jop(SB
∗
, CR
∗
, S
∗)) =
α (−2fSrCfCrS + hSrCfCrS + fSrChCrS + fSrCfCrS + fSrCfCrS + 2hSrChCrS)
(2 + rS + rC)2
=
αrSrC (hSfC + fShC + 2hShC)
(2 + rS + rC)2
> 0
Therefore there will always be a positive eigenvalue associated with the stalemate equilibrium defined by
Eqs. 8–10, and so it cannot be stable.
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